Introduction
The recent worldwide financial markets crisis has raised serious questions about the stability of financial systems. This is particularly true for the US where markets for mortgages, mortgagebacked securities (MBSs), and credit default swaps (CDSs) are widely perceived to be at the root of the crisis (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2009) . While government sponsored entities (GSEs) and broker-dealer intermediaries (e.g., investment banks) surpassed deposit-taking intermediaries as holders of mortgages in the 1990s (Adrian and Shin, 2009a) , the US commercial banking system still accounted for the bulk of originations and was left drastically weakened by the crisis. The This paper considers one source of potential fragility in the commercial banking system: the maturity mismatch between bank assets and liabilities. Maturity mismatch refers to the generally longer times to maturity (or terms) of bank assets relative to their liabilities. There is prima facie evidence that maturity mismatch became greater starting in the late 1990s. Relatively long-term assets -most importantly mortgages and MBSs -made up an increasing portion of bank assets while short-term assets such as cash were falling as a percent of total assets. At the same time, managed liabilities increased relative to core deposits.
The prima facie evidence suggests that maturity mismatch increased in the commercial banking system. However, we present evidence that equity market participants perceived a decrease in maturity mismatch. One explanation for this finding is that, in the lead up to the crisis, mismatch in terms of stated maturities moved inversely to mismatch in terms of effective 1 An exact number is elusive due to post-crisis mergers of bank and non-bank intermediaries and the associated blurring of the distinction between what institutions are or are no commercial banks.
maturities. For example, even though bank assets shifted relatively from commercial loans to mortgages and MBS (where the underlying loans have longer state maturities), expansion of secondary markets for MBSs may have meant that those loans effectively matured (i.e., were liquidated) more rapidly.
Market particpants' perception of bank maturity mismatch may have important implications for interpreting the crisis. Economists have long recognized maturity mismatch as a source of fragility in modern financial systems. Banks and other intermediaries fund long-term, illiquid loans with short-term liabilities which are often payable on demand. If a substantial fraction of creditors simultaneously call in their funds, an intermediary may find itself unable to pay its debts. When this occurs, the intermediary is insolvent, and creditors incur losses.
In regards to the recent crisis specifically, Diamond and Rajan (2009a, p. 606) note that the "consensus on the proximate causes of the crisis [includes] misallocated resources to real estate, financed through the issuance of exotic new financial instruments [which] were largely financed with short-term debt." Adrian and Shin (2008, p. 3) stress the importance of maturity mismatch for US broker-dealer institutions,:
The pinch points will be those institutions that are highly leveraged and who hold long-term illiquid assets financed with short-term debt [.] . . . When the short-term funding runs away, the pinch point financial institutions will face a liquidity crisis. Arguably, this is exactly what happened to Bear Stearns in the US [.] Fahri and Tirole (2009, p. 2) also suggest that the current crisis "is one of wide-scale maturity mismatch." 2 Our paper represents, to our knowledge, the first attempt to empirically examine maturity mismatch in the years leading up to the recent crisis. We focus on the US commercial banking system. While the "shadow banking system" of broker-dealer agents was arguably more important during this time period, we have considerably better and more comprehensive data on the commercial banking system. Also, understanding how maturity mismatch was perceivedand possibly misperceived -in the commercial banking system may be an initial step towards understanding concurrent developments in other financial sectors.
With this in mind, the goal of this paper is to estimate the evolution of the perceived maturity mismatch implied by the returns on US commercial bank equity during the 1990 through 2009 period. Flannery and James (1984) pioneered using the sensitivity of returns to market interest rates to infer effective maturity mismatch. Their basic framework has since been utilized by, among others, Kwan (1991) , Akella and Greenbaum (1992) , and Bharati et al. (2006) . We utilize their approach and estimate the sensitivity of bank equity returns to interest rates using (a) the NASDAQ Bank Index as an aggregate measure and (b) individual stock returns from the 37 largest US bank holding companies. We find evidence of a structural break in the mid-1990s when equity markets begin pricing banks as relatively longer-funded. Further analysis suggests that bank assets such as real estate loans (i.e., mortgages and MBSs) and consumer loans were perceived as having become effectively shorter-term.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our study of the US commercial banking system in the years preceding the financial markets crisis. Section 3 briefly describes the theory underlying our analysis. Section 4 describes the structure and intuition behind our empirical framework. The data used in this analysis are also described in Section 4. Regression results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with discussion and implications for further research.
Motivation
Consider an aggregate balance sheet for the US commercial banking system. How has this balance sheet evolved over the past two decades? Figure 1 plots total leverage (assets as a percentage of equity) and the ratio of cash assets total assets from 1990 through 2009. 3 Pre-crisis, cash assets were a declining part of banks' balance sheets. Then when credit markets froze in 2008, banks hoarded huge amounts of cash assets, presumably in an effort to both increase liquidity and satisfy regulators. This aligns well with common perceptions. It is therefore surprising that banks were actually becoming less leveraged throughout this period.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The declining leverage of the commercial banking system must be viewed in the context of the growth of its assets. Figure 2 plots the natural log of bank assets from 1990 through 2009.
Bank assets grew at a roughly constant rate up until May of 2008. All else equal, when asset values are growing leverage is falling. 4 One interpretation is that banks were not aggressively adjusting their balance sheets along the dimension of additional assets (i.e., searching out new borrowers) during this time period. Regardless of the interpretation, the experience of 3 Leverage is often calculated as assets divided by tier 1 capital while we generally use assets divided by equity. For the purposes of noting the general trend over this time period, this distinction is not important. 4 Leverage equals assets divided by equity. Equity is assets minus liabilities. If assets grow by 1 percent, holding liabilities constant, equity will grow by an identical absolute value and by more than 1 percent. So the ratio of assets to equity -leverage -falls.
commercial banks contrasts with that of broker-dealer intermediaries whose leverage increased during the same time period along with their assets (Adrian and Shin, 2010) .
[Figure 2 about here.]
Another dimension along which to view the balance sheets of banks is that of maturity structure. Leverage indicates the use of debt relative to equity as a source of funding for the acquisition of financial assets. Alternatively, the aggregate degree of leverage may be misleading since banks also choose, for a given level of debt, the term structure of assets funded by that debt. The marginal gains from holding long-term assets can be attractive because longer-term loans pay higher term premiums but, all else equal, the greater the maturity mismatch between a bank's assets and its liabilities, the harder it will be for a bank to make good on its obligations.
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Ostensibly, bank leverage decreased while risk increased in the commercial banking system. One explanation for this is that the maturity mismatch of the commercial banking system was increasing along the way to crisis (Diamond and Rajan, 2009a) . Figure 3 demonstrates that real estate loans (i.e., mortgages and MBSs) increased dramatically as a percent of bank assets from the end of 1998 through 2006. If we assume roughly constant term structure of other bank assets, then Figure 3 suggests that short-term deposits were increasingly backed by assets whose underlying loans had stated terms up to 30 years. 6 While this was occuring, banks also moved from core deposits to higher-turnover managed liabilities. Figure 4 demonstrates that, from 1993
5 Many theoretical models focus on such maturity mismatch as a fundamental part of banks' role in liquidity provision (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983); Becivenga and Smith (1991) ). In these models banks are viewed as "essentially maturity transformers" (Chang and Velasco, 1998, p. 2). 6 One explanation for the increase in (agency) MBS holdings is that is that banks were substituting those holdings for Treasury security holdings. Ambrose and Dolly King (2002) find evidence that this sort of substitution accounts for the increase in GSE debt holdings during the late 1990s when the federal debt was declining. However, those authors focus on total issues rather than on commercial bank holdings. Federal Reserve commercial bank balance sheet data (H.8) reports on Treasury and agency security holdings but does not distinguish between MBS and non-MBS holdings until 2009. (For that year non-MBS holdings started around 2.8 percent of total assets and rose to around 3.5 percent.) on, core deposits (here measured as deposits net of large denomination time deposits) fell steadily from over 65 percent of bank liabilities to less than 50 percent by 2008.
[ Equity market participants, however, are not concerned with the stated maturities of bank assets but, rather, their effective maturities. Effective maturity is determined by the (expected) time to re-pricing. On the one hand, the effective maturity of a security may be greater than its stated maturity if the market for that security is subject to "frictions". For example, a deposit liability may have a stated maturity of zero but, due to transactions and information costs that depositors must incur by to liquidate, its effective maturity may be longer (Flannery and James, 1984 and Gorton (2008, p.74) shows that the subprime mortgage market was increasingly dominated ARMs through the early 2000's. These loan provisions and market trends affect each mortgage's expected time to repricing and therefore the bank's aggregate risk exposure.
Evaluating the riskiness of MBS is even more difficult since it is literally impossible to know the details and provisions of every loan. "Neither group [buyers nor sellers] knows where the risks are located, nor does either group know the value in the chain" (Gorton 2008, p.4) .
Because the actual risk exposure for any particular bank is incalculable, this paper estimates the aggregate level of perceived repricing risk embedded in bank equity prices. Using the technique of Flannery and James (1984) , we estimate the effective term of real estate loans indicating when market participants expect that bank mortgages and MBS will be prepaid or resold.
In the case that mortgages are resold, differences between stated and effective maturities need not be problematic if the secondary market correctly prices interest rate risk. However, the US secondary market for mortgages and MBSs is dominated by two GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 7 These GSEs' activities are motivated, in part, on policy rather than profit concerns. 8 In addition to purchasing mortgages outright, through their "swap programs" the GSEs also exchange mortgages for insured MBS based on the same payment streams. As a result, the underlying long-term assets remain within the commercial banking system though subject to repricing in the short-run. In such a case, the GSEs' actions encourage banks to take excessive risks by allowing them to ignore the term risk of their mortgage assets.
Theory
Grove ( investor who wishes to increase his wealth as interest rates rise (fall) should adjust the structure of his balance sheet so that the weighted duration of the liability stream is greater (less) than that of the asset stream. It follows that the risk-averse investor wishing to hedge his investment against interest rate fluctuations will adjust his portfolio to set these weights equal.
More relevant to the present paper, Grove demonstrates that the effect of a change in the interest rate on a balance sheet will be dependent on the value-weighted duration of assets relative to liabilities. In Grove's model the durations of the asset and liability streams, A m and L m , are choice variables for an investor planning his current balance sheet structure over T periods: 
where h is a parameter associated with a general increase or decrease in interest rates: R(t) + h for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. The approximation, (3.3), formally captures the result that "[a]n increase (decrease) in interest rates will increase net worth if the weighted duration of the liability stream is greater than (less than) the weighted duration of the asset stream" (Grove, 1974, p. 697) .
Intuitively, assets and liabilities represent, respectively, future streams of payments due or owed. Net worth (equity), being the difference between the two, is increasing (decreasing) in the value of assets (liabilities). When interest rates change, this indicates that the payment streams of both assets and liabilities must be discounted differently and that they will be repriced in the same direction. The effect on net worth, then, is determined by the change in asset values relative to the value of liabilities. In the simplest case of a shift in the entire market term structure (h from the model above), payments occurring further in the future will be subject to a larger (in absolute value) repricing: if FV is some future payment (T period from now) and P is its present value then, An immediate implication for banks, or any institution characterized by the issue of short-term liabilities to acquire longer-term assets, is that we would expect their equity values to be negatively related to market interest rates. This expectation would be based on an assumption that banks are short-funded (i.e., the average effective maturity of bank assets is greater than that of bank liabilities). If, on the other hand, a bank were to be long-funded (i.e., the average effective maturity of assets is less than that of liabilities), then we would expect that its net worth is positively related to market rates.
Empirical Framework
Flannery and James (1984) propose a method of studying the maturity mismatch of bank assets and liabilities. They use data on a sample of 67 banks and bank holding companies from 1976 through 1981 and assume that, for a given bank, j,
where, R jt = the holding period return on j's stock over t;
R mt = the holding period return on some stock index over t;
R lt = the holding period return on a constant maturity index of default risk-free bonds over t.
R jt is the growth in j's equity; R lt proxies (inversely) for market interest rates 10 ; R mt is a control for other factors affecting firms' net worth generally.
The parameter of interest is lj , associated with R lt . The effect of changes in market interest rates on a bank's equity should become larger (smaller) when its balance sheet composition becomes longer-funded (shorter-funded). Since R lt is related inversely to interest rates, lj should increase (decrease) when j's balance sheet becomes shorter-funded (longerfunded).
In this paper we focus on balance sheet data representative of the US commercial banking industry as a whole from 1990 through the earlier part of 2009. The regression equation (4.1) can be straightforwardly made to accommodate aggregate data:
where, 10 Prices and yields (i.e., implied rates of interest) have an inverse relationship for any financial asset.
R t = the holding period return on commercial bank stocks over t; R mt = the holding period return on a general stock index over t; R lt = the holding period return on a constant maturity index of default risk-free bonds over t.
In this paper we analyze both a US aggregate bank-based stock index (4.2) and individual bank holding companies (4.1).
For an aggregate indicator of the holding period return on commercial banks (R t ) (i.e., the percentage change in equity as priced by the market) we employ weekly changes in the subsamples separately. Here we merely note that, in all cases and samples, the unit root null hypothesis is easily rejected by the ADF tests. Finally, numbers of observations for the full sample and two subsamples are reported in table 1. These will correspond to observation numbers in, respectively, the full sample and subsample regressions reported below.
[ Table 1 14 For the remaining 37 holding companies, stock price series are corrected for splits and mergers and are converted into holding period returns (R it , i = 1, 2, ..., 37).
In addition to estimating the l associated with both the NASDAQ bank index and individual bank holding companies for our full sample, we will also be interested in estimating how this parameter changed over time in the lead-up to the crisis. To do so we perform "rolling regressions" with a moving window of 201 weekly observations. We compute l estimates centered on dates (i.e., from regressions including that observation and 100 observations before and after) starting from September 30 th , 1992 and ending with a l estimate centered on Estimates of the α i coefficients from (4.3) indicate whether, on the margin, increasing the proportion of a banks' balance sheets composed by a given asset category are associated with increases (α i > 0) or decreases (α i < 0) in perceived maturity mismatch.
Results
In this section we report results from regressions using returns on the NASDAQ bank stock index and individual US bank holding companies. To forshadow, we find that in the later 1990s equity market perceptions of maturity mismatch in the US commercial banking system decreased. Furthermore, among bank asset categories, real estate loans (mortgages and MBSs) and consumer loans were perceived as having shorter effective time to maturities.
i. NASDAQ Bank Stock Index Results
We first report results based on the NASDAQ bank stock index.The estimates of l from the full sample are presented in Table 2 . Whether using the S&P 500 or the NASDAQ composite, partial correlation with of bank returns with general stock market returns is always positive and significant at the 1 percent level or better. Returns on firms in the commercial banking industry are positively correlated with publicly-traded firms generally.
The parameter of interest (β l ) is always estimated positive. When its estimate is statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better, the point estimate is between 0.046 and 0.097. This is consistent with US banks having, on average over the 1990 through 2009 time period, assets of longer effective time to maturity than liabilities. This aligns with the stated maturities of commercial banks assets relative to their deposits.
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[ certainly more definitive when the S&P 500 is the control stock index, in every case, the null of no structural break can be rejected with 90 percent confidence or better.
[ Table 3 about here.]
Based on these tests, Table 4 the later period are only significant when using the NASDAQ composite control and either the 7-or 10-year treasury holding return. However, conventional significance tests must be interpreted with case in this context. The null is that the coefficient is zero and a l = 0 is implies that there is no maturity mismatch. What is more interesting in Table 3 is that the estimates for the 1990 to 1996 period are uniformly higher than those for the 1997 to 2009 period.
[ Table 4 
about here.]
Of course, one explanation for these smaller coefficients associated with the later period is that the volatility of bank returns decreased. ii. Table 5 reports l coefficient estimates and significance levels for the 37 largest publiclytraded bank holding companies. The dependent variable is the holding period return on their stock shares, and a negative l implies that a bank's liabilities are more sensitive to market interest rates than its assets (i.e., the bank is effectively long-funded). this is only possible for 27 holding companies. Surveying the point estimates, in the large majority of cases the estimate of β l is lower for the later period beginning after 1996. In 28 cases, coefficient estimates were significant at the 10 percent level in both the before and after periods.
Individual Bank Bank Holding Company Results
In 27 of these 28 pairs, the coefficient estimate was smaller in the later period, indicating that the banks were perceived as having become shorter-funded. In a total of 73 cases the earlier period estimate is positive and statistically significant while the later estimate is lower. (These cases are the shaded entries in tables 6A and 6B.) Tables 7A, 7B , and 7C report 90 percent confidence intervals for the tables 6A and 6B
regressions. There are only 13 cases (in cases associated with only 5 bank holding companies)
where the confidence intervals do not overlap. 17 However, though these cases are few, in each of them (which are shaded entries) the estimate for the later period is statistically significantly lower than that from the earlier period.
[ Tables 6A and 6B about here.] [ Tables 7A, 7B , and 7C about here.]
To summarize the results reported in this section thus far, there is evidence based on the interest rate sensitivity of both the aggregate NASDAQ Bank Index and the largest US publicly traded commercial bank holding companies that, in the mid 1990s, equity markets began to price bank stocks as if they had become relatively less short-funded. Shareholders perceived the effective maturity mismatches of bank balance sheets as having become smaller and, in some cases, insignificant.
iii. Asset Categories
If equity markets perceived less of a maturity mismatch starting in the later 1990s, why did this occur? Was a specific category of bank assets being perceived as effectively shorter- Alternatively, perhaps the change was spurred by the sustained policy of low interest rates of the Federal Reserve. Diamond and Rajan (2009b, p. 5) argue that, "if policy drives shortterm interest rates to a low level, and solvency and financial stability constraints on future policy rule out future high short-term rates, then financing illiquid assets with short-term debt will be profitable and safe, at least for a while." If market participants believed that the Fed was constrained to keep rates low, then this would remove the interest rate risk associated with longer-term assets. This could affect equity returns in a way observationally equivalent to a decrease in maturity mismatch. Additionally, sustained low interest rates can have systematic effects such as the increasing use of adjustable-rate mortgage loans and balloon payments which tend to increase the potential for short-term repricing.
In this paper, we analyze the maturities of different asset categories by considering the partial correlations of different asset categories, relative to equity, with estimates of β l .
Specifically, we run twenty four regressions of the form (4.3) from section 4 above. figure 5A -5C where the NASDAQ Bank Index was the basis for the dependent variable. We run analogous rolling regressions for each of the 27 bank holding companies reported on in tables 6A and 6B. For each rolling regression we take the median lt from across the 27 holding company regressions. These median lt s series constitute the dependent variables for six pairs of (4.3) regressions. The lt s series from the six NASDDAQ Bank Index (4.2) regressions constitute the other six pairs of (4.3) regressions.
For each of the twelve regressions, our right-hand-side variables are weekly, seasonally adjusted totals from Federal Reserve aggregate commercial bank balance sheet data (so observations numbers are identical to those stated in table 1 for each of the 1990 to 1996 and 1997 to 2009 subsamples.) Our choice of assets categories is meant to broadly account for loans to businesses, loans to consumers, mortgages/MBSs, and bank reserves respectively. Table 8 reports the 90 percent confidence intervals associated with the different asset category coefficients. A positive coefficient estimate indicates that an increase in that type of asset relative to equity increases maturity mismatch (i.e., increases lt ); the converse for a negative coefficient The most striking result is that in every pair of regressions, the coefficient estimate of consumer loans is statistically significantly lower for the later period. In most cases, the coefficient estimate goes from significantly positive to significantly negative. This indicates that in the earlier period, increasing consumer loans relative to equity is associated with an increase in maturity mismatch, while in the later period, an increase in consumer loans correlated with a decrease in maturity mismatch. This evidence may indicate that loans were perceived as increasingly subject to short-term repricing. However, consumer loans were falling as a percent of bank assets over the 1990 to 2009 time period. (See figure 7. ) If the perception of consumer loans were to account for smaller overall maturity mismatch, then the effect would have to be large enough to outweigh this decreased consumer loan share.
[Figure 7 about here.]
Alternatively, we know that mortgages and MBSs were an increasing percent of bank assets over the 1990 to 2009 time period. In half of the regression pairs the coefficient estimates on real estate loans were statistically significantly different and lower in the later period. (There are two regression pairs where the coefficient estimate is significantly higher in the later period.
These pairs are bolded in table 8.) This evidence suggests that mortgages and MBSs were perceived as shorter term in the later period. However, it is important to note that in no case is the real estate loan coefficient significantly negative. In either period, increasing real estate loans relative to equity is associated with increasing maturity mismatch.
Referring back to figure 3, the time series for mortgages and MBSs as a percent of commercial bank assets is dominated by the large, persistent increase starting in 1999 and continuing through 2006. To control for this time trend, table 9 reports on regressions analogous to those of table 8 except that time trends are included. The results are similar. In regressions based on NASDAQ Bank Index lt s, the larger estimated effects associated with mortgages/MBS in the earlier period are more striking. Also, now in a statistically significant way, increasing cash assets, on the margin, decreased maturity mismatch but by considerably more in the earlier (1990 to 1996) time period realtive to the later (1997 to 2009).
In considering the effects of different assets categories, one must keep in mind the magnitudes of these assets relative to equity. In all but one regression pair, the commercial and industrial loans coefficient is significantly higher and positive for the later period. While real estate loans were increasing as a percent of bank assets from 1990 to 2009, the commercial and industrial loans share was falling. (See figure 8.) So the changing real estate and commercial and industrial loans shares combined with changing perceptions -commercial and industrial loans being viewed as longer-term; mortgages and MBSs being viewed as shorter term -may have led to perceived smaller maturity mismatch. The above is, of course, exceedingly speculative and at best a call for further research.
Concluding Discussion
In this paper we consider one source of potential fragility in the commercial banking system: maturity mismatch. There is prima facie evidence that maturity mismatch became greater starting in the late 1990s as mortgages and MBSs made up an increasing portion of bank assets while cash assets declined. However, we present evidence that equity markets perceived bank assets as having become effectively shorter term relative to liabilities during that time.
Economists have long-recognized maturity mismatch as a source of fragility in modern financial systems. If market participants underestimated maturity mismatch -especially if it actually became more pronounced -then Fahri and Tirole (2009, p. 2) may be correct in calling the current crisis "one of wide-scale maturity mismatch."
Our paper represents, to our knowledge, the first attempt to empirically establish how the maturity mismatch in the US commercial banking system was perceived -and possibly misperceived -in the years leading up to the current crisis. We analyze the sensitivity of bank equity returns to market interest rates using (a) the NASDAQ Bank Index as an aggregate measure and (b) individual stock returns from the 37 largest US bank holding companies.
We find evidence of a structural break in the mid-1990s when equity markets begin pricing banks as relatively longer-funded. Further analysis suggests that, amongst bank assets, real estate loans (i.e., mortgages and MBSs) and consumer loans were perceived as having become effectively shorter-term. Why did market perception of these asset types change in the years leading up to crisis? We are in a position to at best speculate informally. Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level. Full sample period is the week of October 31, 1990 through the week of October 7, 2009. The 1990 to 1996 sample period is the week of October 31, 1990 through the week of December 28, 1996. ADF1 and ADF2 denotes Augmented-Dickey-Fuller statistics from unit roots tests including, respectively, trend only and trend with intercept. Lag length in both cases was based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). Notes: *, **, and *** denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level. Standard errors are in parentheses. Full sample period is the week of October 31, 1990 through the week of October 7, 2009. The 1990 to 1996 sample period is the week of October 31, 1990 through the week of December 28, 1996. Shaded pairs indicate that (i) the 1997-2009 point estimate is lower than the 1990-1996 point estimate and (ii) the 1990-1996 estimate is statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. 1990-1996 -0.272 0.078 -0.275 0.196 -0.296 0.131 -0.197 
